

# Austria

## 62. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, March 31, 1969, 8 p.m.

### PARTICIPANTS

The President  
Chancellor Klaus  
Henry A. Kissinger  
Harry Obst (Interpreter)

The Chancellor expressed his gratitude that the President had found it possible to meet with him on this very busy day. He said it was clear to him that the President could not find the time, during his initial months in office, to pay a visit to any of the smaller countries. He would hope, however, that later on the President might find an opportunity to include Austria and maybe Switzerland on his itinerary of foreign visits. He congratulated the President on his successful European trip.<sup>2</sup>

The President replied, he was looking forward to a visit to Austria some time in the future. He fondly recalled his visits to Austria in 1956 and 1963.<sup>3</sup> He had been greatly impressed by the generous assistance given by the Austrian people to the Hungarian refugees in 1956.

A country's importance could not be judged by its size. Austria's location in the heart of Europe and its mediating role between the communist bloc and the free countries made it an important nation.

The Chancellor said, he had told Secretary Rogers earlier that Austria was determined to continue its efforts toward East-West détente despite the grave setback suffered as a result of the invasion of Czechoslovakia in August of 1968.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL AUS-US. Confidential; Exdis. The meeting took place at the White House. Drafted by Harry Obst, staff interpreter in Language Services. Approved by Walsh on April 17. Klaus was in Washington to attend funeral services for former President Eisenhower.

<sup>2</sup> President Nixon visited Europe February 23-March 2.

<sup>3</sup> As Vice President, Nixon visited the camps set up for Hungarian refugees in the wake of the unsuccessful 1956 revolution. Documentation relating to this December 18-24, 1956, mission is in *Foreign Relations, 1955-1957*, volume XXV, Eastern Europe, pp. 534-539. Nixon's 1963 visit was made as a private citizen.

<sup>4</sup> A memorandum of this March 31 conversation is in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL AUS-US.

The President stated that the United States were also interested in reducing tension and attached importance to all détente efforts. It was important, however, to ground such efforts on a basis of reality and not on just hope. It would be cruel to lift up the hopes of the people to unwarranted heights and then have to dash them.

It may seem easy for the US and the Soviet Union to just sit down together and think they could settle all the problems of the world. Prior to any settlement with the Soviet Union, two preconditions had to be met. First, the interests of all the free countries would have to be considered. Secondly, it would have to be assured that any settlement would preserve the chance for freedom in the future.

He was continuing to negotiate on disarmament and to try to increase trade and mutual contacts. But a more solid basis of reality would have to be found.

(Mr. Kissinger leaves the room)

The Chancellor remarked that though the “policy of small steps” was useful, the key to creating a calmer and better world was to be found in the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Could he make a suggestion to the President? As it was not likely that Mr. Nixon would be able to come to Austria in the near future and as it might not be easy for Secretary Rogers to get away soon, how about sending Mr. Kissinger to Austria to continue political talks? Mr. Kissinger had many friends in Austria and a tremendous reputation. The Chancellor would be seeing a number of East European leaders this year and it might be appropriate to talk about some matters. It may work just as well on the second or third level.

The President welcomed the idea and promised to arrange for Mr. Kissinger and others to come to Austria. Talking to Mr. Kissinger would be as good as talking on the first level. He assured the Chancellor that Austria would not be overlooked.

The Chancellor expressed his and his country’s very best wishes for the enormous task the President was faced with. He assured the President that he could count on the assistance of the Austrian Chancellor at any time.

**63. Telegram From Secretary of State Rogers to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

New York, September 23, 1969, 2110Z.

Secto 24/3160. Secretary's Bilateral with Austrian FonMin, Sep 22.

1. Secretary raised topic of SALT. He said we did not know whether Gromyko would raise matter in meeting this evening. If there was favorable response on SALT from Soviet side, Secretary would push for Vienna as site for talks. Waldheim said it would be important for his government to get agreement by Soviets on Vienna site because of implications for that city as an international meeting place. He said Soviets had not responded when Austrians raised question of Vienna as site. Waldheim said he had discussed matter with Karjalainen and Finns were not campaigning to hold meeting in Helsinki. Unfortunately, Soviets might feel they owed something to Finns for their invitation to hold ESC in Helsinki. Austrians had been more "reticent" because ESC proposal had appeared so vague. Unfortunately, Austrians had incurred certain amount of Soviet ill-feeling because of (a) recent Sudeten-German meeting in Vienna and (b) Austrian mass media's harsh criticism of Soviets at time of anniversary invasion of Czechoslovakia. Waldheim was agreeable to our making proposal to Soviet, if they pushed for Helsinki site, for compromise on location for climatic reasons: six months in Vienna, six months in Helsinki. Secretary said we also wanted to check out our own physical plant at Embassy Helsinki.

2. Waldheim said Austrians were convinced set-up in Czechoslovakia will stabilize as Soviets want. Czechs no longer have independent policy. As a result Austrian state visit to Romania, Waldheim was certain Soviets would not move against Romania at any time in near future. Domestic political scheme in Romania was under tight control of Romanian CP. Romanians only want certain amount of independence in foreign policy. Rumors of Soviet invasion of Romania have no basis in fact. Secretary asked Waldheim if he had expected Soviets to invade Czechoslovakia. Waldheim said no, but situation there had been different. Dubcek had, from Soviet standpoint, lost control of internal situation. Soviets had feared 1968 situation was leading to neutralist government in Prague. Soviets do not want to "go beyond" events in Czechoslovakia and indeed now want to redeem themselves. Secretary

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 7 AUS. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to Bonn, Bucharest, London, Moscow, Paris, Vienna, Helsinki, USEC, and Prague. Rogers and Waldheim were in New York attending the UN General Assembly meeting.

commented he was certain Soviets did not make decisions in field of power politics on basis of public opinion. Waldheim agreed, but insisted Soviets want to keep status quo, at least in Europe. He thought that "almost Stalinistic" monolith which was Romanian regime could not be assailed by Soviets.

3. Subject of ESC was raised. Secretary said we had expressed our views at last NATO meeting. Waldheim believed it was important for us to know agenda and clear items to be discussed at any such conference. He felt that subject matter could not in any case be limited to German problem.

4. Waldheim raised subject of European integration. Problem for Austrians was how to continue their efforts to join Common Market. Their exports to Common Market countries were up. He appreciated US position on European unity and Austrian EC association. He said Schumann had told him France could accept Austria as special case. There was even possibility Italians would allow Austria to take up their case again in Brussels, despite earlier Italian veto,<sup>2</sup> once they settle South Tyrol problem (which had greatly improved in last two years). Secretary said US would continue policy of supporting, although not with public statements, UK bid for EC entry.

**Rogers**

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<sup>2</sup> Italy had opposed admission of Austria prior to a settlement of the Alto-Adige issue. Austria initially sought an association agreement with the EEC, and in 1972 negotiated a special economic arrangement with the Community.

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**64. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 4, 1971.

SUBJECT

The Austrian State Treaty and the Acquisition of Defensive Missiles

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 668, Country Files—Europe, Austria, Vol. I. Confidential. Sent for information. A copy was sent to John Lehman (Department of Defense). A notation on the memorandum reads: "Hold for HAK."

As a result of Foreign Minister Kirchsclaeger's visit to Moscow earlier this year, the Austrians believe that the Soviets would now agree (unlike their 1964 position) to interpret the State Treaty so as to permit Austria to acquire short range defensive missiles. The British and French agree with us that Article 13 of the Treaty<sup>2</sup> can legally be interpreted as permitting this acquisition. They also agree that some form of confirming written exchange among the signatories is necessary (though the French do not want to be too rigid). The Austrians, on the other hand, fear that an attempt to get the Soviets to confirm this positive interpretation in writing would be counterproductive, and so the Austrians would like some form of *de facto* approval procedure.

Our own consideration of this matter has been temporarily sidetracked because of Congressional considerations. As a matter of law, the Executive has the authority to "interpret" treaties without recourse to the Senate, and there is even some legal support for the Executive alone agreeing to a "modification" of a treaty in some cases. However, in State's initial contact with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff, it became apparent that more than mere notification to that Committee would be necessary. (In an April 3 speech at Yale, Senator Fulbright charged—in another context—that the Executive reduces commitments to a near nullity by the device of reinterpreting treaties.)

State is currently awaiting receipt from the Austrians of their missile "shopping list" which they have promised to send to all signatories of the Treaty. The Committee staff has indicated great interest in precisely what types of missiles Austria desires.

At this point at least, there does not seem to be anything for you to do. A memorandum from State on this is at Tab A.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> It prohibited "self-propelled or guided missiles."

<sup>3</sup> Attached but not printed.

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**65. Telegram From the Embassy in Austria to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Vienna, July 23, 1971, 1615Z.

4536. Subject: USG-USSR-PRC Relations. *Summary:* During Ambassador's call on Foreign Minister Kirchsclaeger latter said deterioration of USG-USSR relations would be too high in price to pay for new USG-PRC policy<sup>2</sup> and was afraid this might be the case. FonMin said he hoped SALT had been used as forum for preparation of Soviets for Kissinger trip to Peking. *End summary.*

1. This morning, accompanied by DCM, I called on FonMin Kirchsclaeger for pre-vacation tour d'horizon. Although the Minister confessed to being extremely tired, I found him in friendly and convivial mood throughout hour long conversation.

2. On behalf Secretary Rogers I thanked FonMin for GOA's statement offering to intern Vietnam POWs. He accepted message affably and said GOA pleased to do it.

3. Kirchsclaeger asked me to comment on recent USG-PRC developments. I replied that not in a position to provide further information beyond what we both already knew and added that this would be the case until Secretary Rogers officially announces USG's position, which I understood would happen in relatively near future.<sup>3</sup>

4. Kirchsclaeger said he was concerned about the reaction of the USSR: that a climate of mutual confidence recently had been developing between Washington and Moscow and he fervently hoped this would continue to be the case. He believed that a deterioration of USG-USSR relations would be too high a price to pay for a new USG-PRC policy, but was afraid this might be the case. FonMin volunteered his assumption that SALT had been used as forum to prepare Soviets psychologically for new USG policy towards PRC. Said he feared if this were not the case Soviets may react unfavorably, jeopardizing SALT, since Soviets notoriously touchy regarding anything they might consider "encirclement" or affecting their national security.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 15-1 AUS. Confidential. Repeated to USDel SALT V. Smith was in Helsinki at the SALT talks.

<sup>2</sup> Reference is to a July 15 announcement that meetings between Kissinger and Chinese officials had produced an agreement for a visit by President Nixon and the opening of diplomatic relations between the United States and the People's Republic of China.

<sup>3</sup> August 2. For text of the statement and the Secretary's comments to the press, see Department of State *Bulletin*, August 23, 1971, pp. 193-196.

5. Kirchsclaeger made the point that just as in the 30's there had been a German trauma on this subject so is there today a Soviet trauma. I did not comment on above other than to reiterate President's statement that our move vis-à-vis PRC was not directed against any nation.<sup>4</sup>

6. In answer to my question Kirchsclaeger said there was no decision yet on selection of Austrian Ambassador to Peking although he believes a man would be named in early September.

7. During meeting FonMin commented on his recent trip to Italy, his plan to attend UNGA, status of Austrian hopes for association with EC, Austria's position on Law of the Sea, Austria-Czechoslovakia relations and some aspects internal Austrian politics all of which subjects septels.

8. At conclusion of meeting I inquired when Chancellor Kreisky planned to leave on vacation since I had asked for appointment to make courtesy call before we both left town. Kirchsclaeger said this was Chancellor's last day in his office, that he was extremely busy and that my chances of seeing him were virtually nil unless I had important subject to discuss. He mentioned that he himself had been trying to reach him by telephone for last two hours without success. Upon return to Embassy I found that I had appointment to call on Kreisky later this afternoon together with DCM.<sup>5</sup>

**Humes**

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<sup>4</sup> For text, see *Public Papers: Nixon, 1971*, pp. 819–820.

<sup>5</sup> In telegram 4549 from Vienna, July 26, Ambassador Humes reported: "Nothing new came up during my call on Chancellor. Conversation covered much the same ground as my earlier talk with ForMin Kirchsclaeger." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–1 AUS)

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**66. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Austria<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, October 17, 1971, 1917Z.

190285. From the Secretary.

1. You should seek an early meeting with the Chancellor for the purpose of delivering an oral message of the greatest importance. It is essential that you see the Chancellor prior to the Cabinet meeting at which the Chinese Representation issue is to be decided. At the meeting you should read to the Chancellor the following message, and leave with him an aide-mémoire consisting of the text which you have delivered orally.

"I have been instructed to express to you, with the frankness appropriate between friends, the great importance which the United States Government attaches to the forthcoming votes in the United Nations on the issue of Chinese Representation.

"My government is aware, of course, that you recently established diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China and that your government would not wish to take a position in the United Nations inconsistent with that fact. We are also appreciative of the care you took, when establishing those relations, not to commit yourself on voting in the United Nations.

"The President of the United States, too, is vitally interested in better relations between the United States and the People's Republic of China. At the same time he is not prepared to sacrifice basic principles to that end. He also is convinced that continued representation of the Republic of China in the UN would be helpful in achieving a more secure and more peaceful Asia. The United States Government cannot, therefore, be indifferent to the expulsion of representatives of the Republic of China from the United Nations. Indeed, we believe such action will cause, in the United States, widespread popular and Congressional resentment and even anger. Such an action would, therefore, greatly harm our own ability to make the United Nations a more effective institution.

"My government is certain that it is not incompatible for a country to work for improved relations with the People's Republic of China

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 668, Country Files, Europe, Austria, Vol. I. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Drafted by Herz, Feldman (IO) and Richard F. Pedersen (C); cleared by Charles K. Johnson (EUR/AIS), Hillenbrand (in substance), Armitage, and Haig; and approved by Richard D. Christiansen (S/S-O).

and yet to vote for the Important Question and Dual Representation resolutions. That is what we are doing.

“If Austria could join with other countries to prevent the expulsion of the Republic of China, my government has no doubt that you would thereby contribute significantly to the development of a sounder and more realistic world community.

“The United States Government is aware of the concerns that Foreign Minister Kirschlaeger expressed to the Secretary of State about the name of the ‘Republic of China.’<sup>2</sup> We had carefully considered this matter and concluded that this was the best course to follow. Any other terminology would clearly have tended to create ‘Two Chinas,’ which we did not wish to do. On the other hand the texts were carefully phrased so that no one who supported them would have to commit themselves to the claims of the Republic of China. Indeed the decisive fact is that our proposal gives the seat in the Security Council to the People’s Republic of China.

“In view of the special considerations which make this issue one of particular concern to the United States Government, and to the future of the United Nations, we ask for your support of our proposals. My government particularly expresses the hope that you will vote yes on the Important Question resolution, which is designed solely to prevent the expulsion of the Republic of China.”<sup>3</sup>

2. At the conclusion of your oral presentation (but not to be included in the aide-mémoire which you will leave with the Chancellor), you should add the following: “I have been instructed to inform you that these views have the full support of the President of the United States and that he places great stress upon your attitude on this issue.”<sup>4</sup>

**Rogers**

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<sup>2</sup> Reported in telegram Secto 79 from USUN, October 6. (Ibid., RG 59, Conference Files, 1969–1972: Lot 73 D323, Entry 3051B, CF 540)

<sup>3</sup> For text of the U.S. resolution, see UN doc. A/L 632 and Add. 1 and 2. The motion was rejected in the General Assembly by a vote of 55–59 on October 25.

<sup>4</sup> In telegram 6753 from Vienna, October 22, Humes reported that despite assurances from the Chancellor’s office that no decision on Chinese representation would be made before he met with Kreisky, the Foreign Minister had announced Austria’s decision to vote for the Albanian resolution and abstain on the Important Question resolution. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 668, Country Files—Europe, Austria, Vol. I)

67. **Transcript of Telephone Conversation Among the President's Assistant (Haldeman), the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), and President Nixon<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 11, 1972, 10:50 a.m.

K: Mr. President.

H: This is Bob. I'm in the President's office. I was thinking of a stopping point on the way to Russia.<sup>2</sup> I was wondering whether Austria is a possibility and going to Salzburg, not Vienna. Spending two nights as originally planned to do which would destroy the idea of a rest stopover.

K: Well, if he wants to do that. I have no great objection to that.

H: He is just wondering if that isn't better than going to Switzerland.

(At this point, the President came on.)

P: Hello.

K: Hello, Mr. President.

P: I don't like the feeling of a Spanish base and I didn't like the feeling of the Azores. Switzerland poses a problem which you are aware of. Let me say this for Austria. I have always had a very close relationship with Austria. The Ambassador is a good friend of mine and also it is a country which is not allied to us or the Russians and rather than going to Vienna, going to Salzburg which is a lovely town.

K: And the weather will be nice too. Can we land there?

P: We landed there in a Constellation last time. And I don't mind doing the Austrian thing. What's an hour's conversation during the day.

K: I share your concern about Switzerland. And if you go there just over night you are going to have a tremendous operation there for one night's rest and if you go for two nights it looks like a vacation so I think Austria . . .

P: You don't mind our exploring it.

K: No.

P: This Ambassador Hans Gruber is a helluva guy. I know him extremely well. I got to know him at the [Hungarian] refugee period.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 21, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File. No classification marking.

<sup>2</sup> Reference is to Nixon's planned summit meeting in Moscow May 22-30 with Brezhnev. Nixon stopped in Salzburg May 20-22 en route to Moscow.

K: And they certainly have the facilities there, Mr. President.

P: They do and the people will be friendly—that’s another thing. We have no problem there of unfriendly people. They love Americans in Austria.

K: I think if you are willing to see them . . .

P: Right. I think we should see them, but only have an hour’s meeting.

K: A courtesy call.

P: Right, a courtesy call. We do need the two nights.

K: I think, Mr. President, that is a good idea.

P: I will have Bob check that out then. And do you want to check it with Gruber?

K: Gruber?

P: Yes.

K: I could do it easily enough or my office could do it quickly. I will get you an answer by tomorrow. I am sure they will be enthusiastic.

P: Fine, you go forward with Gruber.

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**68. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 17, 1972.

SUBJECT

Your Stopover in Austria

*I. Background and Your Objectives*

Austria regards itself as neutral by treaty but not by choice, history or inclination. By all these she is firmly pro-Western. But Austrian Constitutional Law and the State Treaty of 1955, which ended the occupation, gave Austria back its independence and calls for its “perpetual” neutrality, make it difficult for Austria to give political form to

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 478, President’s Trip Files, Briefing Book, Visit of Richard Nixon, President of the United States, to the Federal Republic of Austria, May 1972. Secret. Sent for information. A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it. For text of his public remarks in Salzburg, see *Public Papers: Nixon, 1972*, pp. 614–617.

this Western orientation. The Austrians have, however, sought to put their neutrality to creative use in helping to better relations between Eastern and Western European countries. They see in the present military and political equilibrium in Central Europe the best guarantee of their neutrality and security. Austria has stoutly defended its neutrality and freedom against Soviet pressures and occasional threats, notably at the time of the Hungarian revolution in 1956, when you visited the country, and during the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968.<sup>2</sup>

Chancellor Bruno Kreisky, with whom you will meet in Salzburg, is a close friend of Willy Brandt. He heads the Socialist Party. Biographies of Kreisky and other Austrian leaders are at Tab A.

The Socialists which took over the government in 1970 and strengthened their position in national elections last fall, reject dogmatic Marxism and are strongly anti-Communist. Their constituency includes both workers and many white collar employees. They have stressed full employment and expanding social welfare benefits. The opposition is made up of the conservative People's Party and a small liberal party.

The United States, as one of the four occupying powers and signatories of the State Treaty, has played a key role in Austria's post-war history. Yet no American President has ever paid a state visit (although President Kennedy went to an unsuccessful Summit in Vienna with Khrushchev in 1961). Your stopover will to some extent meet Austria's long-standing desire for a visit to the country as such. It will thus also balance at last state visits paid to Austria by Khrushchev (1960) and Podgorny (1966).

*Your chief objectives*—which are to a large degree accomplished by the fact of your visit—are to underscore our support for Austria's constructive neutrality, our respect for its determined and even-handed defense of that policy, and our friendship for a small country, whose strategic geographic location and influence in the UN and potentially in Eastern Europe might one day make its support of substantial importance to us. Chancellor Kreisky carries much prestige among European socialists. Your meeting thus also presents a valuable opportunity through him to make our Vietnam policies better understood within the Socialist parties. Kreisky, who is intelligent, active and experienced in foreign affairs, may also have some helpful insights into Soviet interests and aims in Europe.

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<sup>2</sup> Documentation relating to the Austrian response to the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 is in *Foreign Relations, 1964-1968*, volume XVII, Eastern Europe; Austria; Finland, Documents 202-204.

Austria's objectives parallel ours. Its chief interest in your visit is to get a sympathetic hearing for the problems which its neutrality entails, in particular those increasingly troublesome ones of adjusting its relationship to the European Community (EC). The Austrians will want particularly to acquaint you with their special perspective on European security matters, including the Conference on European Security and Cooperation (CSCE).

## II. Issues and Talking Points

*You should:*

—review with Kreisky your expectations for the Moscow Summit and the prospects for a SALT agreement there;

—lay out your views on European security matters, in particular our policies on the CSCE and Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR);

—note that there are no bilateral US-Austrian problems.<sup>3</sup>

In addition to these issues, *Kreisky may want to:*

—discuss his efforts to give Austria a more dynamic intermediary role in East-West relations;

—explain Austria's vital interest in negotiating an industrial free trade area with the European Community and seek your support for these negotiations.

Since you will have only a brief time with Kreisky, your talks will of necessity cover only one or two of the main issues:

### A. Summit

You may wish to indicate to Kreisky how you expect the Summit to be affected by the Vietnam situation and by Moscow's response to our military actions there. You might list for him the kinds of bilateral US-Soviet agreements that are in the making (science, space, environment). Since Austria has provided a site for the SALT negotiations, Kreisky will want to have your judgment on the importance of an agreement for Summit success and on the likelihood of follow-on negotiations.

You should note that your decision to go on with the visit was not lightly taken, in view of Moscow's support for the North Vietnamese invasion.<sup>4</sup> However careful preparations have convinced us that the Soviets wish to come to concrete bilateral agreements that may open

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<sup>3</sup> The President wrote next to this sentence: "SALT".

<sup>4</sup> Launched on March 30 from bases in Laos. The offensive continued into May, eventually provoking a resumption of U.S. bombing attacks on North Vietnam.

the way to wider understandings. For that reason we decided to proceed to the Summit—without any illusion, however, that it will transform the US-Soviet relationship or eliminate basic differences.

*You should:*

- emphasize our pragmatic, case-by-case approach in dealing with the Soviets at the Summit;

- indicate that we see improvement of relations with Moscow as a protracted process and point out the areas of difference that persist;

- initiate discussion of the Soviets' European policy, which obviously is of primary interest to the Austrians, pointing out the imponderables that stem from the status of the German treaties and the Berlin Protocol; and

- ask for Kreisky's assessment of Soviet objectives and current policies. (He is a shrewd and well-informed informer.)

### *B. European Security and the CSCE*

We are generally sympathetic to Austrian efforts, revitalized by Kreisky, to play a more active intermediary role in relations between Eastern and Western Europe. As heir to an empire that once included parts of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, and Yugoslavia, Austria has a good understanding of politics in Eastern Europe and an ability to put across the Western viewpoint to the political leadership there. A working principle of Vienna's foreign policy is to promote Austria as a site for East-West negotiations and international conferences.

The Austrians hope that Vienna will be selected as one of the alternate sites for a European Security Conference (CSCE). They want a Conference mainly for the sake of détente atmospherics but hope that it will not weaken NATO solidarity, on which the Central European equilibrium is so dependent.

*On European security generally, you should:*

- express understanding and appreciation for Austria's overall contribution to the improvement of East-West relations:

- say that we prefer to focus on specific initiatives to overcome the divisions of the continent and will judge each Austrian proposal to this end on its merits.

*On the CSCE, you should:*

- explain that at present we see more advantages to the Soviets than to the West in a European Conference or in any broad effort to devise an all-European security system;

- note that we expect Brezhnev to push hard at the Summit for an early CSCE;

- explain that we have never been opposed to the idea of a CSCE in principle but consider that certain basic issues producing tension should be examined and resolved first;

—reiterate our view that the Berlin agreement should be signed before we move onward toward a CSCE, recalling to Kreisky that we are ready to sign it now but the Soviets have so far stuck to the linkage with the German treaties which they earlier established;<sup>5</sup>

—express our preference, assuming signature of the Berlin agreement, for exploratory discussions late in the year;

—say that we can, under these conditions, agree to a Conference next year and preliminary discussions between East and West about it in the late fall of this year; and

—ask Kreisky for his views on the Conference, in particular on how to bring the East Europeans to agree to the Western objective of bringing about freer movement of information, ideas, and people.

#### C. *Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions*

The Austrians have been carefully watching NATO's gropings toward a common position on this issue, for they are concerned about the effect which reductions might have on the military balance in Europe. Like other neutrals, Austria would like to play some role in MBFR negotiations and any ensuing reduction arrangements. Possibly Kreisky will suggest Vienna as an appropriate venue for negotiations.

##### *You should:*

—point out that we have been studying this complex issue for nearly four years and so far have been unable to see a negotiating outcome that could be both manifestly acceptable to the East and also clearly in our security interest; but we are continuing our efforts;

—say that we have concluded that MBFR *negotiations* and the European Conference should be separate, although we do not want to foreclose the possibility of a *general discussion* of MBFR at the conference;

—add that we do not now envisage participation by the neutrals in the negotiating process;

—add that you hope that the present procedural impasse on how to start exploratory discussions with the East can be broken and hope this can begin more or less simultaneously with CSCE preparations.

#### D. *Vietnam*

Kreisky on May 2 stated that although he opposes the war he is “not prepared to hold any single state responsible for it.” He does not endorse the views of some European Socialists who favor diplomatic relations with Vietnam. Although he supports UN membership for all divided countries, he wants to postpone establishment of relations with North Vietnam until the question of the two Germanies is resolved.

##### *You may wish to:*

—acknowledge his generally helpful statement;

—review our Vietnam actions since Hanoi's all-out invasion began.

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<sup>5</sup> For text of the September 3, 1971, Four Power agreement, see *Documents on Germany, 1944–1985*, pp. 1135–1143. The final Quadripartite agreement was signed in Berlin on June 3, 1972. For text, see *ibid.*, pp. 1204–1206.

### *E. Austria's Relationship with the European Community (EC)*

This is a vital issue for the Austrians, and it is discussed in greater detail separately (Tab B). Briefly, Austria, and the other members of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) are trying to negotiate an industrial free trade area with the EC. Forty percent of Austria's exports go to the EC and 55% of its imports come from this area. Kreisky has been making the rounds of EC capitals to drum up support, negotiating for Austria's position.

The main problem arises because the Soviets take the view, with which we agree, that the Austrian State Treaty prohibits full Austrian membership in the EC. Kreisky hopes to negotiate an economic agreement that would imply a tacit political link with the Community but one the Soviets could not protest. He argues that if Austria cannot soon negotiate such an agreement, it will be faced with progressive "Finlandization" and will have to consider an arrangement with the Soviet-dominated economic grouping, COMECON.

#### *Kreisky may:*

- seek your support for Austria's negotiations;
- make the point that Moscow's tolerance level in Europe is now high because of its interest in a CSCE, so that it might acquiesce to an Austrian-EC arrangement if made soon;
- explain that Austria wants a link with an enlarged EC as a whole to counterbalance growing German economic influence in Austria, which raises Soviet suspicions;
- ask for withdrawal of the US objections to EC tariff reductions for exports of paper, which is a major Austrian export.

#### *You should:*

- say that we recognize that Austria, because of the State Treaty, cannot become a full EC member and we consider it a special case;
- express sympathy for Austria's need to reach some arrangement with the EC short of full membership;
- say that we hope that his arrangement will be compatible with the GATT and will do minimal damage to the trade interests of third countries, including the United States;
- reaffirm, if Kreisky raises this special issue, our position that we want equal access to the EC market for US paper and pulp.

### *III. Secretary Rogers' Memorandum*

A memorandum from the Secretary giving his assessment of the visit and our objectives is to be found in the attached book.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> Attached but not printed.

IV. *Additional Talking Points*

A. *Salzburg Consulate*

Conceivably the Austrians will allude to their hope that we will reopen our Consulate in Salzburg, which was closed nine years ago as an economy move.

A set of talking points on the Salzburg Consulate is to be found at Tab C.

B. *Arab-Israeli Problem in European Security Conference*

Kreisky believes that the Arab-Israeli problem should be on the Conference agenda. He may mention this. Austria, traditionally alert to developments in the Balkans, believes that Soviet activities in the Eastern Mediterranean deserve close attention and discussion at a Conference.

If this comes up, you should restate our Near Eastern position, with which the Austrians may not be fully familiar. You should say that:

- work on this crucial issue should not be postponed until the convening of a Conference, whose date is indefinite;
- the parties directly involved should negotiate settlement;
- the best avenue for progress lies in the “proximity talks” between Israel and Egypt, which we are ready to help arrange, on an interim agreement to reopen the Suez Canal.

V. *Background Papers and Biographic Sketches*

For consultation as required, background papers on the following points are to be found in the attached book:

- Austria’s Role in Central Europe
- Austrian Foreign Policy
- Austrian Internal Situation

Biographic sketches of all key Austrians whom you are likely to encounter as well as Ambassador Humes and his deputy are also to be found in the attached book.

69. **Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and the Austrian Ambassador (Gruber)**<sup>1</sup>

Washington, May 17, 1972, 12:07 p.m.

K: Hello.

G: Gruber speaking.

K: Hello Mr. Ambassador. How nice to hear from you. I'm calling you about some of the reports we are getting about large demonstrations in Salzburg and also the fact that these crowds are going to be let in on the airport when the President arrives. And I just want to say, you know, I know there are limitations on what you can do. But it would really have very unfortunate consequences here . . .<sup>2</sup>

G: I don't think this is in any way the case, but I will call them up in Vienna right away.

K: And you know, the President has very warm feelings towards Austria and it would be a pity to destroy them with this sort of thing.

G: No, no, I will talk to them right away and we'll see that we get the true picture . . . the trouble is the news reports very often exaggerate it or are not quite . . .

K: Well, I know what . . . You know, I know it's not the feeling of the Austrian government or the vast majority of the people.

G: Salzburg should be the ideal to settle then I would say; there should be no problem whatsoever.

K: Well that's what I would have thought. But I just thought I should call you.

G: That was very fine. Thank you very much and I will get in touch with them immediately.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 21, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File. No classification marking.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 3382 from Vienna, May 17, reported: "In press conference following yesterday's (May 16) cabinet meeting Chancellor Kreisky placed expected 'anti-Nixon demonstrations' into pro-U.S. perspective in stating that Austrian Communist Party 'which is most Moscow-servile CP will in fact demonstrate against Brezhnev and Kosygin since Pres. Nixon's Salzburg stop-over came about as a result of their invitations to U.S. President to visit Moscow.' He pointed out that demonstrations are permissible in a free society, but Austrian authorities will insist that Salzburg demonstrations remain strictly within the law." Sonnenfeldt summarized the telegram in a May 18 memorandum to Kissinger. (Both are in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 668, Country Files—Europe, Austria, Vol. I)

K: Very good.  
G: Thank you very much.  
K: Nice to talk to you.  
G: Thank you very much.

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## 70. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

I-25875/72

Washington, July 19, 1972, 9:30–10:15 a.m.

### SUBJECT

Courtesy Call by Minister Luetgendorf

### PARTICIPANTS

#### *Austrian Side*

Minister for National Defense—Karl Ferdinand Luetgendorf  
Military & Air Attaché, Embassy of Austria—Brig. Ferdinand Folten

#### *U.S. Side*

Deputy Secretary of Defense—Kenneth Rush  
Principal Deputy Asst Secretary of Defense (ISA)—Armistead I. Selden, Jr.  
Deputy Asst Secretary of Defense (ISA)—John H. Morse  
Military Asst to the DepSecDef—Colonel John G. Jones, USA  
Austrian Desk Officer, EurReg/ISA—Charles T. Lloyd

### 1. Preliminary Discussion

Secretary Rush welcomed Minister Luetgendorf and noted that Austria was the only place in Europe which the Russians had left voluntarily. Minister Luetgendorf responded that in Austria the Communist Party holds no seats in Parliament and secures only 2½% of the vote. The Secretary observed that this is unusual because one might expect the Russians to have thoroughly organized an effective party before leaving.

### 2. Soviet Policy

Secretary Rush referred to the change in Russian posture as demonstrated in Brandt's "Ostpolitik," the Berlin Agreement<sup>2</sup> and the groundwork being laid for MBFR. He said that the Russians think their

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–1 AUS. Secret; Sensitive; Exdis. Drafted by Lloyd and approved by Selden on July 31. The meeting took place in Rush's office at the Pentagon.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 5, Document 68.

best interest is served at the present time by détente. However, this is not a change of Russian objectives but a change in means or tactics. Their objectives are to have the U.S. withdraw from Europe, to break up NATO and to spread their influence in Europe. Minister Luetgendorf said that the small countries in Europe particularly hope that the U.S. will keep its forces in Europe, because there will be great danger if troops are reduced. He agreed that Russia's objectives remain the same and on the basis of his study he is not sure that its attitude of co-existence and appeasement will continue during the next 20 years.

### 3. *SALT*

Minister Luetgendorf expressed the view that it is necessary for the little countries to take part and that their military experts have the opportunity to discuss military potential in the area. He also expressed the hope that the so-called peace activists in the younger generation had not influenced the political representatives at the SALT conference.

### 4. *Status of Russian Hierarchy*

The Minister expressed the view that Brezhnev and Kosygin are now in a position similar to the one Khrushchev reached. He said the Army takes a position not in accord with that of the political leadership and this could lead to a change in government. The Secretary noted that we were aware of the difficulties faced by the political leadership in May after the North Vietnam attack when the President had taken firm action to mine North Vietnamese harbors and bomb military targets in the North. He noted that timely ratification of the Berlin agreement by the FRG<sup>3</sup> had made it impossible for the Russians to cancel President Nixon's trip. He said that he believes that the present Russian leaders have now suppressed the opposition and remain in command of the situation.

### 5. *MBFR and CSCE*

The Secretary said he expects the Russians to push for the CSCE for a number of reasons; that for them it would, in effect, be a World War II peace treaty because it recognizes political changes within Europe, would provide a calming period in the West to enable the Soviets to face the Chinese in the East and finally would enable the Russian Government to satisfy some of the economic pressures that exist. The Soviet game plan is to get the U.S. to reduce its presence in Europe and to split up NATO. The Secretary said the U.S. game plan is

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<sup>3</sup> Apparent reference to Bonn's ratification of its "Eastern treaties" with Poland and the Soviet Union on May 19, 1972. The text of the two treaties is printed in *Documents on Germany, 1944-1985*, pp. 1103-1105 and 1125-1127.

the reverse, to maintain U.S. presence and strengthen NATO as we seek a guarded détente based on MBFR.

The Secretary said he was confident that President Nixon will be re-elected and will maintain U.S. strength in Europe. He said that the stronger Western Europe remains the safer Austria is. Over a period of time, the U.S. would hope to attract Warsaw Pact countries such as the GDR, Poland and Romania, even Russia itself, to free hundreds of millions from the yoke of Stalinism. He noted that Soviet hardliners see this as an effort to corrupt and weaken Stalinism.

#### *6. Military Equipment for Austria*

The Minister expressed his appreciation for the great U.S. help which enabled Austria to build up its Army. He said that it has been ten years since Austria had a credit of \$46 million and that it runs out this year. He reported that much of the Army's equipment is old and needs replacing and asked whether it would be possible to get a new credit to buy material from the U.S. Army, especially communications and signal equipment. He also mentioned the need for heavy weapons including M-60, M-109 howitzer, 106mm recoilless cannon, anti-tank cannon ammunition and helicopters. He suggested that if this material were available as surplus as was the case between 1956–60 this would be good for Austria. Secretary Rush said that the U.S. would be glad to consider any Austrian request that the Minister might propose. He said that we have very friendly feelings for Austria and while she must be neutral we consider her a good friend of ours.

#### *7. Reorganization of Austrian Army*

The Minister said that the strategy of Austrian defense is moving toward that of Yugoslavia in which the Army will not engage in major battles but will utilize Austria's mountains and confine defense efforts to small groups fighting behind enemy lines. For this, he said, they need good communications, anti-tank and small anti-aircraft weapons. He said that the Army would maintain one interceptor aircraft group in order to defend Austrian air-space. It would also be important to have helicopters for communication and to shift troops. Mr. Morse noted that the Yugoslavs are interested in the same type of equipment for similar purposes. Secretary Rush agreed that communications and mobility are vital in such operations.

#### *8. Yugoslav Political Situation; Yugoslavs in Austria*

The Minister noted the potential political difficulties in Yugoslavia. The Secretary commented that the presence of different races and rivalries presented an opportunity for promoting a civil war from outside. Mr. Rush noted that only this week Yugoslavia was taking action to control its factions. He suggested that the Russians might want to

let Yugoslavia break itself up rather than promote civil war or support an attack from without. However, he hopes that the present détente may be sufficiently interesting to the Russians to prevent them from pushing such a war. On the other hand, local power struggles could be stimulated.

The Minister said there are now 120,000 Yugoslav workers in Austria and he does not know what they would do if Tito dies. Last year when the Yugoslavs conducted maneuvers only 35% of its reserves called back from Austria and Germany actually returned. Secretary Rush agreed the Yugoslavia is a focal point of interest today and noted that the French are concerned and Minister of Defense Debré recently told him he has it uppermost in his mind. The Minister said that he is aware of one plan for Hungary to attack Yugoslavia through Austria and therefore Austria is now prepared to close the Hungarian border. He noted that the Russians would like a port on the Adriatic.

#### 9. *Left-Wing Youth*

Secretary Rush asked the Minister whether the radical youth (JUSO) posed problems for him. Minister Luetgendorf stated that while he is independent of political matters he is helping the Socialist party control its own left-wing youth. Secretary Rush said that the situation is serious in Germany where Brandt may lose the December elections because of the youth vote. Minister Luetgendorf said that the situation in Austria is less troublesome because the students are less excited.

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### 71. **Telegram From Secretary of State Rogers to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

New York, September 29, 1972, 2034Z.

Secto 27/3575. Memorandum of Conversation: FM Rudolf Kirchsclaeger (Austria) September 27, 1972; 11:45 a.m. Waldorf 30A.

1. Participants: Austria—FM Rudolf Kirchsclaeger, Ambassador Dr. Karl Gruber, Permanent Rep. Dr. Peter Jankowitsch, Dr. Schallenberg; US—The Secretary, Mr. Stoessel, Mr. Blankinship (reporting officer).

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL AUS-US. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Vienna. Rogers and Kirchsclaeger were in New York attending the UN General Assembly meeting.

2. *Summary:* The FM said Austria soon will recognize North Vietnam but it will maintain same level of representation in Hanoi and Saigon. FM was noncommittal on whether action would be delayed in response Secretary's suggestion that delay would be helpful. The Secretary reviewed the status of CSCE and MBFR and stressed need to act on terrorism.

3. *Norwegian Referendum:*<sup>2</sup> The FM said that the Norwegian referendum on the EEC might have serious consequences—raise doubts in Denmark and lead the EEC to reject Finnish agreement. From the point of view of a united Europe, the outcome is serious.

4. *US Consulate in Salzburg:* The Secretary said that he hopes the Department of State will be able to reopen the Consulate at Salzburg as soon as some financial problems are worked out.

5. *CSCE:* The FM inquired about CSCE. The Secretary responded that the allies are discussing a date for beginning preparatory talks; Nov. 22 seems a likely date. He said that SALT talks may also resume in November in Geneva. He noted that shifting the location of SALT I between Vienna and Helsinki had caused some problems.

6. *Recognition of Hanoi:* FM said that in late October or early November the Austrian Government intended to contact Hanoi with a view of establishing relations with North Vietnam. The channel had not yet been determined, but the Austrians wished to follow the Swiss example of recognizing Hanoi. He said that he thought it was advisable to inform the US first before taking such action. The Secretary expressed regret about the decision particularly when peace negotiations are proceeding. He said that he hoped that the Austrians would find it possible to delay until at least the end of November.

7. *Representation in East Germany:* The FM said that the Austrians also intend to follow the Swiss example in opening up the commercial representation in East Germany by the end of the year.

8. *Terrorism:* The Secretary stressed the importance of acting against terrorism. The FM said that Austria would ratify the Hijack Convention<sup>3</sup> but that Austrians were concerned about the problem which would arise if a hijacked plane flew into Austria from the Soviet Bloc with passengers claiming asylum. The Secretary said that the Hijack Convention made allowance for this situation; the country where the hijacker landed could prosecute him without returning him. The Secretary emphasized that commercial aviation is so important to

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<sup>2</sup> In September a binding referendum on Norwegian accession to the EEC resulted in a 53 percent vote in favor of rejecting membership in the Community.

<sup>3</sup> For text of the December 16, 1970, Hague agreement on suppression of air piracy, see 22 UST 1641.

everyone everywhere that hijacking a commercial aircraft could not be justified on any grounds.

9. 25 Percent Assessment:<sup>4</sup> The Secretary expressed hope that Austria would help out on this problem.

10. MBFR: The FM inquired about negotiations on MBFR. The Secretary responded that the Soviets want no linkage and no parallelism. Hence, we do not use these words. However, we will carry on preparatory work for CSCE and MBFR in the same time frame. The negotiations will not necessarily occur at the same place for both subjects. The FM asked who would participate in MBFR. The Secretary responded "those primarily concerned." As a practical matter those who have troops are the ones that should be primarily involved in the negotiations; others have only a peripheral interest—though they must be kept informed. He wished, however, to assure the FM that the US would make no decisions which would undermine Europe security. This is why the US has insisted upon the world "balanced." FM inquired whether in CSCE the US anticipated negotiating a treaty or coming out with a declaration. The Secretary replied this is undecided. But he thought that a clause such as para 11 of the Moscow Declaration of Principles<sup>5</sup> might well be included. We also intended, he said, to press for an undertaking on freedom of movement. The FM agreed to the usefulness of such a provision.

**Rogers**

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<sup>4</sup> The United States paid 31 percent of the UN budget and was pressing to get other states, most notably the Soviet Union, to shoulder a greater share of the burden, while reducing its own percentage of the costs.

<sup>5</sup> For text, see *Public Papers: Nixon, 1972*, pp. 633–635.